LIV Golf’s fifth season ended not with the planned grand finale in Michigan, that was quietly cancelled, but with a whimper with Indianapolis its last stop.
Whilst Jon Rahm picked up the title for the third year in a row, nobody was able to say with any confidence whether the tour will return in 2027.
In fact, just as the Champagne bubbles settled, LIV Golf started informing employees their jobs will end, downsizing operations as it attempts to secure new investors, having learnt in April that the Public Investment Fund (PIV) of Saudi Arabia would end financial backing after this season.
The Financial Times on 31 August reported that LIV Golf may file for bankruptcy protection as soon as the first week of September, with settlement offers to current players owned millions of dollars of just a few cents to the dollar.
What went wrong
LIV Golf’s problem was never really a sporting one, but structural. PIV reportedly ploughed some US$6 billion into the league since 2022, underwriting signing fees, guaranteed contracts and generous prize money yet with no obvious pathway to commercial self-sufficiency.
Broadcast deals brought limited audiences, sponsorship never matched the outlay, and repeated attempts to secure Official World Golf Ranking recognition, even after extending events to 72 holes this season, went nowhere. LIV struggled to secure the legitimacy in needed.
In a move that looks remarkably like a pre-pack insolvency, LIV is reportedly in talks with London-based BC Partners Credit to agree a new funding package that would see its golfers simultaneously settling claims with the LIV regime and agree financial terms for ‘LIV2.0’.
However, according to the Financial Times, securing commitments from enough top tier players to interest BC Partners and other funders has “proved challenging”.
It has put the commercial reality of ‘guaranteed’ sports contracts firmly under the spotlight.
A guarantee is only as good as the counterparty’s solvency, and long-term player deals underpinned by a single funder, rather than diversified revenue, carry a structural risk that looks very different today than it did five years.
And its not just players. Vendors and contractors owed money face the same exposure, albeit further down the priority queue. They are unlikely to secure what is owed, and may be reluctant to support any LIV 2.0.
The road back
For LIV players, the more interesting question may be reputational rather than financial.
The PGA Tour’s Returning Member Program, creating a route back after LIV defections, has already been used once (by Brooks Koepka). Whether DeChambeau, Rahm and others follow – and on what terms the Tour might ask after years of litigation and rivalry – will say as much about golf’s institutional memory as about any player’s game.
LIV was always a test of whether sovereign wealth could simply out-muscle a century of sporting infrastructure. The answer appears that whilst money can buy disruption, it cannot by longevity.
But then again, any business owner with a single client of benefactor already knows that.
David Little is a Partner at Bishop & Sewell in our expert Sports Law and Corporate & Commercial teams.
If you would like to contact him, please call on either 07968 027343 or 020 7631 4141 or email: company@bishopandsewell.co.uk.
The above is accurate as at 01 September 2026.
The information above may be subject to change. The content of this note should not be considered legal advice, and each matter should be considered on a case-by-case basis.
